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The Social and Cultural Aspects of 
Climate Change Winners 
Robin Kundis Craig†
  INTRODUCTION   
 
In The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, Pro-
fessor J.B. Ruhl does the academic and policy debate over cli-
mate change much benefit by raising the issue of climate 
change winners.1 As he acknowledges, discussing the fact that 
some—perhaps many—people will benefit from climate change, 
at least in the short run, is often considered distasteful or polit-
ically incorrect.2 Nevertheless, every major cultural shift, geo-
political event, and natural disaster—and climate change ra-
tionally can be compared to all three—has created both winners 
and losers, regardless of how happy observers might be about 
that fact.3 During the eighteenth century’s French Revolution, 
heads rolled and nobles fled, but many others came to power as 
a result, Robespierre and Napoleon among them.4
 
†  William H. Leary Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney 
College of Law, Salt Lake City, UT. The author may be reached at robin 
.craig@law.utah.edu. Copyright © 2013 by Robin Kundis Craig. 
 Similar sto-
 1. J.B. Ruhl, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 206, 207 (2012).  
 2. See id. at 209. 
 3. See id. at 232; see also A GLOBALIZING WORLD? CULTURE, ECONOMICS, 
POLITICS 90–96 (David Held ed., 2d ed. 2004) (discussing how the cultural 
shift toward globalization has created winners and losers); Frédéric Bozo, 
“Winners” and “Losers”: France, the United States, and the End of the Cold 
War, 33 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 927, 927–31 (2009) (reviewing history’s attempts 
to define winners and losers after the Cold War); Joseph Scanlon, Winners and 
Losers: Some Thoughts About the Political Economy of Disaster, 6 INT’L J. 
MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 47, 47–50 (1988) (discussing theories that 
suggest that natural disasters can have winners and losers). 
 4. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. DUIKER & JACKSON J. SPEILVOGEL, WORLD HIS-
TORY 532–40 (6th ed. 2010) (providing a general background on the rise and 
fall of both Robespierre and Napoleon). 
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ries could be told about the twentieth century’s Communist 
revolutions in Russia and China.5
Beyond political figures, moreover, societies have long rec-
ognized that wars also produce private winners and private 
losers beyond the soldiers on the battlefields.
  
6 However, wheth-
er those private winners get labeled “war profiteers”7 or “war 
heroes”8 depends as much on cultural constructions of their 
meaning and public relations as on actual differences in their 
motives and actions. To use an example from the American 
Revolutionary War, the difference between a privateer and a 
pirate is often in the eye of the person writing the history 
books.9
To expect that climate change will be different is sheer fol-
ly. Climate change is altering the basic conditions of the most 
fundamental physical, chemical, and biological processes that 
support life on earth, including human societies and the ecosys-
tems upon which they depend (collectively, socio-ecological sys-
tems or SESs).
 
10 As Professor Ruhl aptly describes, some locali-
ties will generally profit from these shifts even as others 
(arguably most, especially as climate change progresses) be-
come steadily or abruptly worse off.11 Similarly, even within 
communities that are generally worse off because of climate 
change, some individuals and businesses are still likely to bene-
fit—again, at least in the short run.12
 
 5. See generally S.A. SMITH, REVOLUTION AND THE PEOPLE IN RUSSIA 
AND CHINA: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY 192–235 (2008) (providing a background 
of the Communist revolutions in Russia and China). 
 Climate change winners, 
 6. See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 252 (briefly noting that some people will at-
tempt to benefit from wars). 
 7. For a recent example of such labeling, see Ryan, The 25 Most Vicious 
Iraq War Profiteers, BUS. PUNDIT (July 22, 2008, 5:02 PM), http://www 
.businesspundit.com/the-25-most-vicious-iraq-war-profiteers/.  
 8. See, e.g., Fred Andrews, American Industry as War Hero, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 2, 2012, at BU5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/03/ 
business/in-freedoms-forge-us-industry-as-war-hero-review.html?_r=0 (review-
ing ARTHUR HERMAN, FREEDOM’S FORGE (2012), which argues that American 
business and industry won World War II). 
 9. See, e.g., Jesse Lemisch, Privateering, the American Revolution, and 
the Rules of War: The United States Was Born in “Terrorism” and Piracy, GEO. 
MASON U. HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Aug. 19, 2002, 7:11 PM), http://hnn.us/ 
articles/915.html. 
 10. See Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transfor-
mation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 9, 10–14, 23–27 (2010). 
 11. See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 207–08. 
 12. Id. at 259–60. 
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in other words, will emerge at all scales—nations, regions, 
communities, businesses and industries, and individuals.13
Professor Ruhl quite consciously limits the focus of his 
analysis primarily to individuals and, to a lesser degree, busi-
nesses and industries.
 
14 Moreover, he also consciously chooses 
to focus on the direct implications of self-defining climate 
change winners for climate change policy itself.15
Moreover, I agree with Professor Ruhl’s recommendations 
for climate change law and policy. Climate change mitigation 
efforts cannot afford to be held hostage by the—I’m betting—
comparatively small percentage of (let’s not forget to empha-
size) relatively short-term climate change winners, at the ex-
pense of what will likely be billions more people who will be los-
ing their homes, water, food, economic productivity, political 
stability, cultural identity, health, and lives as a consequence of 
climate change impacts. Nor should we forget, as Professor 
Ruhl also notes, that too much indulging of climate change 
winners could come at the expense of ultimately disastrous 
long-term consequences for the planet as a whole—the conse-
quences that are predicted if humans do not change course with 
respect to climate change mitigation.
 I highlight 
these choices not because I find fault with them but instead 
merely to point out that Professor Ruhl has deliberately chosen 
to limit the contours of his examination, a completely rational 
decision in light of the fact that his is the critical first foray into 
this controversial subject.  
16 Similarly, Professor 
Ruhl is quite right to suggest that policymakers should try to 
do everything possible to harness the energy and capital (eco-
nomic and political) that climate change winners are likely to 
generate in favor of beneficial “no regrets” climate change ad-
aptation strategies.17 As several scholars, including myself, 
have emphasized, climate change adaptation is a much differ-
ent legal and policy problem than climate change mitigation.18
 
 13. Id. at 213. 
 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 231 (using the term “climate change winner” to refer to 
“people and businesses”). 
 15. Id. at 241. 
 16. See id. at 257–69 (making recommendations for climate change miti-
gation policies). 
 17. See id. at 269–72 (detailing recommendations for climate change ad-
aptation policies). 
 18. See Craig, supra note 10, at 15–18, 28–40; see also, e.g., Daniel H. 
Cole, Climate Change, Adaptation, and Development, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 1, 2–3, 7–9 (2008) (comparing mitigation and adaptation as economic 
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Climate change mitigation has a known, if politically excruciat-
ing, solution—reduce the total concentrations of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere by reducing anthropogenic emissions 
of those gases.19 It also has a limited number of potential policy 
vehicles for achieving those goals: command-and-control regu-
lation of greenhouse gas emissions; cap-and-trade programs for 
greenhouse gas emissions; carbon taxes; geoengineering efforts 
(probably the most controversial of the options); or some com-
bination thereof.20 Climate change adaptation, in contrast, re-
quires continually evolving strategies to cope with continually 
changing locally and regionally specific socio-ecological condi-
tions.21 Colorado’s adaptation measures for dealing with pine 
beetle infestations22 will not help Floridians coping with sea-
level rise and saltwater intrusion into critical aquifers used for 
water supply.23
 
problems); Holly Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change with Law that Bends 
Without Breaking, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 45, 60–66 (2010) 
(comparing mitigation and adaptation law and politics); Victor B. Flatt, Adapt-
ing Laws for a Changing World: A Systemic Approach to Climate Change Ad-
aptation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 269, 270–74 (2012) (discussing many of the differ-
ences in approach between climate change mitigation and climate change 
adaptation); Margaux J. Hall & David C. Weiss, Avoiding Adaptation Apart-
heid: Climate Change Adaptation and Human Rights Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 
309, 319–25 (2012) (distinguishing adaptation responses from mitigation re-
sponses in the context of human rights); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adapta-
tion and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 
363, 365–76 (2010) (providing a brief history of adaptation and mitigation pol-
icy focuses in the United States); Robert R.M. Verchick & Abby Hall, Adapting 
to Climate Change While Planning for Disaster: Footholds, Rope Lines, and the 
Iowa Floods, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2203, 2209–10 (distinguishing adaptation and 
mitigation). 
 Indeed, even adaptation strategies for sea-level 
rise will need to vary from location to location, depending on 
how fast the sea is rising, the exact combination of sea-level 
rise, pre-existing climate change impacts (permafrost melting 
in Alaska, changing ocean currents in Oregon, more severe 
 19. See Craig, supra note 10, at 28 (characterizing climate change mitiga-
tion as a relatively simple legal problem, albeit quite challenging politically). 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. at 71–72. 
 22. See generally D.A. LEATHERMAN ET AL., COLO. STATE UNIV., MOUN-
TAIN PINE BEETLE (2007), available at http://www.ext.colostate.edu/pubs/ 
insect/05528.pdf (discussing effects of and control measures for the pine bee-
tle). 
 23. See generally Ryan Wiedenman, Adaptive Response Planning for Sea-
Level Rise and Saltwater Intrusion in Miami-Dade County (Spring 2010) (un-
published M.S. thesis, Florida State University), available at http://www.coss 
.fsu.edu/durp/sites/coss.fsu.edu.durp/files/DIR_Weidenman_woAppendix.pdf 
(discussing adaptation measures for sea-level rise and saltwater intrusion). 
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storms in the Gulf of Mexico), and the number of immediately 
vulnerable coastal amenities in a particular location (village 
stability, energy infrastructure, water supply, fish stocks, coral 
reefs, navigation).24
Thus, I do not disagree with Professor Ruhl’s initial focus 
on climate change policy or his analysis of the likely tendencies 
of self-defining climate change “winners” and policy responses 
to them. Nevertheless, there are social and cultural dimensions 
that will shape the phenomenon of climate change “winners,” 
and the social meaning of being a climate change beneficiary is 
likely to vary from context to context or place to place. Moreo-
ver, as social-meaning scholars have long recognized, these so-
cial and cultural constructions are equally likely to influence 
law and policy—and, indeed, will probably have broad legal and 
political influence.
 
25 As Lawrence Lessig recognized in 1995 (in 
a very different context), the process of social construction and 
the construction of social meaning are the sources of “real” so-
cial orthodoxy—the constructions and meanings that law either 
works from or acts to change.26
Recognition of social construction in the context of climate 
change beneficiaries adds two important additional considera-
tions when evaluating the issue of climate change winners. 
First, as noted, Professor Ruhl assumes that climate change 
“winners” will be, in the most important legal sense, largely 
 
 
 24. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Public Health Perspective on Sea-
Level Rise: Starting Points for Climate Change Adaptation, 15 WIDENER L. 
REV. 521, 522–24 (2010) (discussing the need for adaptive management strat-
egies for sea-level rise in part because of its unpredictability). 
 25. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Social Meaning and School Vouchers, 42 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 919, 920, 921–58 (2001) (discussing how changing social mean-
ing can alter constitutional analysis in the context of school vouchers); Rosan-
na Lillian Langer, Dissertation Abstract, Law and Social Meaning: Defining 
Rights and Wrongs Through Administrative Processing, 42 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 701, 706–07 (2004) (examining how the various social meanings of alleged 
violations of Canadian domestic human rights laws get sorted out legally in 
administrative processes); Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: 
Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 
9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 4, 62–77 (2002) (arguing that the U.S. Su-
preme Court incorporated a feminist approach into the social meaning of urine 
testing of pregnant women by concluding that such testing was an ordinary 
criminal search requiring probable cause and a warrant rather than a routine 
administrative search). 
 26. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 943, 946–47 (1995). 
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self-defining.27 However, inevitably, the social meaning of cli-
mate change beneficiaries will also be socially constructed. 
Moreover, because climate change is new and because, in the 
United States at least, governments have been slow to create 
and implement climate change policies,28
Professor Ruhl’s excellent article also implicitly assumes 
that all persons and entities are venturing into the climate 
change era with roughly equivalent social and political status-
es.
 those social construc-
tions of the various categories of climate change beneficiaries 
are likely to substantially influence how people within those 
categories are treated legally. As a result, what it will mean—
socially, culturally, politically, and legally—to be a climate 
change beneficiary will almost certainly not be within the com-
plete (or even substantial) control of the individual beneficiar-
ies themselves. There are, after all, many ways to “win”—as a 
result of blind, dumb luck; Pyrrhically; through innate talent; 
by cheating; by successfully eliminating (through legitimate 
competition or Mafia-style) one’s opponents or competitors; 
through hard work and determination; or by successfully ex-
ploiting others. Likely, the reader had different visceral reac-
tions to each entry on this list. Similarly, how a particular 
community perceives, constructs, and categorizes climate 
change beneficiaries could have social, political, and legal rami-
fications that ripple far beyond climate change policy. As such, 
the first issue that this Essay explores is the wide variety of po-
tential social constructions of climate change beneficiaries and 
the potential ramifications of those classifications. 
29 But, of course, that’s not true. Thus, the second issue that 
this Essay ponders is: What happens to climate change and 
other policies if the culturally defined “wrong” people emerge as 
climate change “winners”? Of course, the social reactions and 
constructed social meanings will not be, at least not entirely 
and probably not substantially, the kind of direct and conscious 
policy choices that Professor Ruhl advocates. They are also not 
the same kind of rational and self-serving political motivations 
that Professor Ruhl reasonably posits for self-identifying cli-
mate change winners.30
 
 27. See Ruhl, supra note 
 Nevertheless, these cultural reactions 
1, at 235 (“What we should care about . . . are 
people and businesses who believe they are better off economically as a result of 
climate change.” (emphasis added)). 
 28. See Craig, supra note 10, at 27. 
 29. See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 232–35.  
 30. See id. at 242–47 (laying out his assumptions regarding how such self-
identifying winners will act). 
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to and constructions of climate change beneficiaries are likely 
to become political forces in their own right, rational or irra-
tional as they may be. They may also, under the right circum-
stances, lead to extra-legal movements, riots, deals, protests, 
marches, sit-ins, non-governmental organization (NGO) crea-
tions, vigilantism, or, in short, the whole gamut of American 
responses to unpopular, outrageous, or “unfair” socioeconomic 
circumstances and change. We do not have to look backwards 
very far to identify the abilities of these impulses to influence 
politics and law; the 2007–2008 mortgage31 and 2008–2009 fi-
nancial32 crises prompted not only policy and legal responses 
but also the Tea Party33 and the Occupy Wall Street34 move-
ments/protests, underscoring one of the biggest cultural-
political divides in U.S. history.35
I.  SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
WINNERS   
 
So, what are some of the possible social constructions of 
climate change winners? Let’s start with the group that is 
probably most likely to slip under the cultural/political radar—
 
 31. See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: The Subprime Mort-
gage Crisis and the Social Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 282–
300 (2008) (discussing the history of the subprime mortgage crisis). 
 32. See, e.g., Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/ 
01/26/business/economy/26inquiry.html (discussing many of the causes of the 
financial crisis). 
 33. See, e.g., About Us, TEA PARTY, http://teaparty.org/about-us/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 4, 2013) (describing the party’s principles). While the Tea Party it-
self traces its origins to the original Boston Tea Party in the American Revolu-
tion, id., most commentators date the Tea Party’s modern creation to February 
2009 and Rick Santelli’s rant against the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act. E.g., Jared A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive the 
Tea Party Movement?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1807, 1813 (2011) (“[T]he movement 
began on February 19, 2009, when financial analyst Rick Santelli denounced 
an Obama Administration proposal . . . .”); Ryan D. Murphy, Tea Party Consti-
tutionalism: Does the “Astroturf” Have Roots in the History of the Constitu-
tion?, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187, 187 (2012) (“On February 19, 2009, the 
Tea Party was born.”).  
 34. See, e.g., About, OCCUPYWALLSTREET, http://occupywallst.org/about/ 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (describing the goals of the movement). 
 35. See, e.g., David Horsey, America’s Political Divide Is Turning into a 
Chasm, L.A. TIMES (June 6, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/06/ 
nation/la-na-tt-political-divide-20120605 (“When it comes to American politics, 
the stark distinctions are actually increasing.”). 
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Professor Ruhl’s passive climate change winners,36 who may 
cause no cultural or political ripples at all. The farmer who 
does a bit better because of warming temperatures may not be 
perceptually all that different from a farmer who has a bumper 
crop during (and because of) an El Niño or La Niña climate 
event.37 Similarly, the farmer who changes crops in response to 
changing climatic conditions and water supply may not be all 
that different from a farmer who switched to growing corn for 
ethanol in response to government subsidies.38
More interesting will be the emerging cultural construc-
tions of the “big splash” climate change beneficiaries—the peo-
ple and entities who are obviously and, in some sense, non-
passively benefitting from climate change’s impacts.
 The farmer is 
still a farmer, the changes she made are “natural”—what any 
rational human being would do—and nobody seems directly 
harmed by those choices. 
39
Even so, however, “winners” come in several flavors. For 
example, climate change winners might be culturally con-
structed as “just lucky,” on par with lottery or slot machine 
winners. Even though “just lucky” is at base a positive social 
construction, it carries with it an implication of lack of dessert 
or moral justification: “lucky” climate change “winners” didn’t 
particularly deserve the benefits they got, even if they can’t be 
blamed for how they came to benefit. As such, a “just lucky” so-
cial construction could easily have political and legal conse-
quences, particularly with respect to governments’ willingness 
 First, of 
course, the relevant communities might basically agree with 
the beneficiaries that they are, in fact, climate change “win-
ners.” If so, the social meaning of being a climate change bene-
ficiary will likely reinforce those beneficiaries’ self-
identifications as positive “winners” and, logically, those win-
ners’ attitudes about climate change policy—the issue upon 
which Professor Ruhl focuses.  
 
 36. See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 228 (describing passive climate change 
winners). 
 37. See NOAA’s El Niño Page, NOAA, http://www.elnino.noaa.gov/ (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2013) (briefly describing the impacts of the two phases of the 
oscillation). 
 38. Bloomberg View, Nearly Half of Corn Devoted to Fuel Production De-
spite Historic Drought, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2012, 12:53 PM), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/17/ethanol-mandate_n_1799046.html (de-
tailing the history of ethanol subsidies’ effects on crop planting). 
 39. See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 228–31 (describing a variety of these non-
passive winners). 
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to engage in wealth or benefit redistribution. As Forbes has 
pointed out, the federal government is more than happy to tax 
lump-sum lottery winnings at the highest possible income tax 
rate, while only seven states do not tax them—and five of those 
don’t have a state income tax in the first place.40 In the 2012 
presidential election campaigns, the two candidates’ tax poli-
cies were vigorously and widely debated.41 Neither candidate, 
however, debated whether truly “just lucky” winners—lottery 
winners, successful gamblers—should be taxed. Instead, the 
most contested tax debates are often focused on categories of 
wealth generation that resonate through multiple social con-
structions which, in turn, generate a multiplicity of social 
meanings that affect the appropriateness of greater or lesser 
taxation, such as transfers of wealthy estates to younger gen-
erations and capital gains.42
Similarly, even if climate change beneficiaries are socially 
constructed as “winners,” exactly how they are constructed will 
probably influence what is expected of them, both legally and 
socially. “Just lucky” climate change beneficiaries should expect 
to pay more taxes, rationally or irrationally, than “diligent, 
hardworking visionaries” who had the foresight to make 
 Are estate taxes double-dipping 
“death taxes” or a fair contribution to society from “undeserving 
trust fund brats”? Are capital gains taxes too low, allowing the 
already wealthy to generate income without “really” working, 
or are they unfair burdens on the capitalists who drive the eco-
nomic well-being of our society? Whichever way the reader 
comes out on these debates, the debates themselves would be 
much more intelligible if we all acknowledged that there are at 
least two social constructions of the people involved and their 
activities—embedded social meanings that inform the percep-
tions of fairness and reasonableness that underlie the for-
mation of tax policy.  
 
 40. Janet Novack, How Much Tax Will You Owe On $640 Million Jack-
pot?, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2012, 12:17 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
janetnovack/2012/03/30/how-much-tax-will-you-owe-on-540-million-jackpot/. 
 41. See, e.g., Toni Nitti, Tax Aspects of the Obama-Romney Debate, Round 
2, FORBES (Oct. 17, 2012, 1:26 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
anthonynitti/2012/10/17/reactions-to-the-obama-romney-debate-round-2/. 
 42. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, The Great American Tax Debate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/ 
business/the-great-american-tax-debate.html (highlighting the disagreement 
in America on whether the wealthy pay appropriate tax rates); Scott Horsley, 
Paris Hilton vs. Death Tax: A Lesser-Known Fiscal Debate, NPR (Dec. 11, 
2012, 5:34 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/12/11/166989049/ 
paris-hilton-tax-vs-death-tax-a-lesser-known-fiscal-debate.  
  
2013] RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS 1425 
 
“shrewd” (however risky at the time) choices and investments. 
Conversely, irresponsible behavior may be more widely tolerat-
ed from people who receive climate change “windfalls” than 
from people who become constructed as “community leaders in 
climate change,” from whom community service and philan-
thropy are likely to be expected. 
More important for this Essay, however, is the likelihood 
that at least some climate change beneficiaries may find them-
selves socially constructed to be social, political, and, ultimate-
ly, legal “losers.” Equally important, such social constructions 
of beneficiaries as “bad,” “unfair,” or even “criminal” may often 
turn on cultural/political happenstance, unpredictable in ad-
vance, rather than on rational policy choices. As noted, whether 
someone is a “pirate” or a “privateer” may depend entirely on 
the exact cultural/political context from which that person’s ac-
tions are judged rather than on a rational categorization of the 
activities themselves—but the legal consequences for the per-
son being so categorized still can be enormous (death43 versus 
lucrative rewards44
To complicate such negative social constructions even fur-
ther, persons profiting from social and economic circumstances 
can resonate through several cultural valences simultaneously: 
The “captains of industry” in nineteenth century America were 
also “robber barons.”
).  
45 Indeed, modern literature’s fascination 
with the “anti-hero” consciously plays with the ambiguity and 
fluidity of many social constructions.46
 
 43. See, e.g., Ex parte Gordon, 66 U.S. 503, 504–05, 1 Black 503, 504–05 
(1860) (denying writ of certiorari to Gordon, who was convicted of piracy and 
sentenced to death). 
 It is important to re-
 44. See, e.g., Aaron D. Simowitz, The Original Understanding of the Cap-
ture Clause, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 121, 132–33 (2009) (discussing the profits and 
rewards of privateers). 
 45. Indeed, this double resonation is so engrained in the story of American 
history that it is taught as such to schoolchildren. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment 
for the Humanities, The Industrial Age in America: Robber Barons and Cap-
tains of Industry, EDSITEMENT!, http://edsitement.neh.gov/lesson-plan/ 
industrial-age-america-robber-barons-and-captains-industry (last visited Mar. 
4, 2013). 
 46. As one perhaps particularly apt example, in Alan Moore’s and Dave 
Gibbons’s graphic novel (now also a movie) Watchmen, Adrian Veidt is both 
the out-in-the-public superhero and the engineer of a fake global threat. See 
ALAN MOORE & DAVE GIBBONS, WATCHMEN (1986). Veidt causes the deaths of 
thousands (including, indirectly, the enigmatic but uncompromising Ror-
schach, who seeks to expose the truth even though he knows Armageddon will 
ensue), from which he methodically earns a fortune while simultaneously unit-
ing the planet in peace. See id.  
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member, however, that such cultural ambiguity can still foster 
legal developments: The abuses on the “robber baron” side of 
the nineteenth century industrialists and monopolists led to 
widespread legal reforms, from antitrust laws to worker protec-
tion laws to food purity laws.47
So, what kinds of climate change beneficiaries might end 
up being the “bad” (as culturally constructed) climate change 
“winners”? If other contexts are any indication, one large subset 
of this group will be people or entities that are perceived as 
winning at the unfair expense of others. Water politics, for ex-
ample, might end up being a particularly fertile breeding 
ground for “bad” climate change “winners.” Stresses on water 
supply are one of the most commonly predicted impacts of cli-
mate change; water is an absolute necessity for life and comfort 
but water supply deals have always had a dark underbelly—see 
Chinatown.
 
48
Geoengineers—especially the unsanctioned ones—are an-
other potential category of “bad” climate change beneficiaries. 
Consider, for example, The New York Times’s front-page story 
on October 18, 2012, about California businessman Russ 
George, who “chartered a fishing boat in July, loaded it with 
100 tons of iron dust and cruised through Pacific waters off 
western Canada, spewing his cargo into the sea in an ecological 
experiment that has outraged scientists and government offi-
cials.”
 Will the companies that champion desalination be 
respected as savvy entrepreneurs or climate change’s version of 
robber barons? What if water entrepreneurs in the West man-
age to negotiate deals and/or legislation to move Great Lakes 
and Mississippi River water across the Continental Divide: Will 
they be saviors or thieves? Or a little bit of both? 
49
his team scattered iron dust several hundred miles west of the islands 
of Haida Gwaii, in northern British Columbia, in exchange for $2.5 
million from a native Canadian group. The iron spawned the growth 
of enormous amounts of plankton, which Mr. George, a former fisher-
ies and forestry worker, said might allow the project to meet one of its 
 Although scientists and both the Canadian and United 
States governments condemned the “experiment,” Mr. George 
reported to the Times that  
 
 47. See, e.g., 3 CLASS IN AMERICA 706–07 (Robert E. Weir ed., 2007) (not-
ing some of the many laws passed to correct robber baron abuses). 
 48. CHINATOWN (Paramount Pictures 1974). 
 49. Henry Fountain, A Rogue Climate Experiment Outrages Scientists, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
10/19/science/earth/iron-dumping-experiment-in-pacific-alarms-marine 
-experts.html?_r=0. 
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goals: aiding the recovery of the local salmon fishery for the native 
Haida.50
Whether Mr. George and the native Haida group should be 
considered misguided rogues, noble visionaries, or outright 
criminals is an open question, but both were clearly seeking to 
undo some of the impacts of climate change (ocean absorption 
of carbon dioxide) for their own benefit.
 
51 Moreover, it seems 
clear that the social meaning that Mr. George and the native 
Haida gave to the iron fertilization experiment differs from 
both the social construction that scientists are imposing on it 
and the legal significance that the affected governments are 
seeking to establish under both domestic and international 
law.52
II.  SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RESPONSES TO CLIMATE 
CHANGE WINNERS   
 
Now let’s consider, beyond the social construction problem, 
how cultural responses to climate change beneficiaries might 
also resonate (probably badly) with existing and sometimes 
barely suppressed social tensions and divisions—tensions cen-
tered around political affiliation, social values, race, ethnicity, 
social status, economic status, education, religion, and property 
ownership. Or, as I put my question originally, what if the 
“wrong” people visibly benefit from climate change? 
I enter this discussion with one very important disclaimer: 
I have no preconceived ideas of who the “wrong” people might 
end up being, and in fact, I would predict that the “wrong” peo-
ple will constitute different subgroups at different times and 
places. The point is, rather, that we have existing social ten-
sions that: (1) we have no reason to expect will disappear any 
time soon; and (2) can be sparked periodically and often unex-
pectedly into social unrest and violence. Remember Rodney 
King.53
 
 50. Id. 
 We would be fools not to recognize that various aspects 
of climate change impacts and climate change adaptation could 
often resonate—again, probably badly—with those pre-existing 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Rodney King was the victim of a brutal beating at the hands of Los 
Angeles police officers in 1991, and videos of the beating led to violent urban 
riots across southern California. Joe Mozingo & Phil Willon, Rodney King Dies 
at 47; Victim of Brutal Beating Became Reluctant Symbol of Race Relations, 
L.A. TIMES (June 17, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/17/local/la-me 
-0618-rodney-king-20120618. Mr. King died in June 2012. Id.  
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tensions and prejudices. Disasters such as Hurricane Katrina 
and Hurricane Sandy show us the many facets of human re-
sponses to bad situations, from heroism to selfless sharing to 
desperation-driven mercy killings and abandonments to selfish 
hoarding to violence to institutional neglect to “forgetting” of 
certain, generally disadvantaged or minority, populations.54
This recognition, too, should be part of the legal and policy 
reaction to the fact that there will be climate change “winners.” 
Certainly, as Professor Ruhl argues, climate change beneficiar-
ies should not be able to claim property rights to support their 
“winner” status.
 
Climate change impacts will inevitably prompt a similar range 
of human responses. 
55
Neither law nor policy can possibly anticipate all of the 
specific social and cultural reactions to climate change benefi-
ciaries. However, they can anticipate that climate change im-
pacts are likely to be destabilizing in at least some times and 
places and that such destabilizations will likely be destructive 
 Conversely, they shouldn’t become the vic-
tims of hate crimes sparked by that status, either. Maybe we 
already have the mechanisms and laws in place to deal ade-
quately with social unrest sparked by identification of certain 
groups as “unfair” or “undeserved” climate change winners—
but that’s not a conclusion we should reach without at least a 
tad more thought. What happens, for example, if 
poor/minority/unpopular communities currently situated on 
subcoastal properties become waterfront owners as a result of 
sea level rise and storm destruction of the former coast line? 
Will their neighbors—especially the displaced former owners of 
coastal property—peacefully allow them that new and at least 
temporarily profitable status, or will there be calls for coastal 
property re-distribution? Or will the social meaning of owning 
coastal property have changed by then from a sign of wealth 
and luxury to being stuck with continual expense and inunda-
tion? Conversely, what if new entrepreneurial responses to cli-
mate change impacts end up visibly concentrating extreme 
wealth in the hands of a few while the surrounding community 
suffers in climate change-induced abject poverty? 
 
 54. See, e.g., Hurricane Sandy: 3 Tales of Incredible Heroism, WEEK (Oct. 
30, 2012), http://theweek.com/article/index/235600/hurricane-sandy-3-tales-of 
-incredible-heroism; Trymaine Lee, Rumor to Fact in Tales of Post-Katrina Vi-
olence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2010, at A9, available at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/us/27racial.html?pagewanted=all. 
 55. See Ruhl, supra note 1, at 272–73. 
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more often than they are creative.56
At the very least, therefore, we should be thinking about 
the adequacy and bent of community leadership in the commu-
nities most likely to be particularly and predictably vulnerable 
to the destabilizing pressures of climate change impacts, based 
on some combination of existing tensions, destabilizing forces, 
and severe and socially disorienting climate change impacts. 
It’s also probably worth starting to think about climate change 
adaptation assistance programs, climate change insurance reg-
ulation, climate change windfall taxation, and climate change 
crimes. On the last subject, for example, it will undoubtedly be 
difficult to define “climate change profiteering” specifically 
enough to satisfy the demands of due process, although at least 
we have the examples of war profiteering
 Similarly, law and policy 
can anticipate that at least some climate change beneficiaries 
will be socially constructed to be “undeserving,” “exploitative,” 
“bad actors,” or “criminal.” These social meanings may be nei-
ther fair nor legally accurate—or they may be both, depending 
on what exactly the beneficiaries were doing to benefit from 
climate change and how closely law hews to socially construct-
ed meanings.  
57 and securities profi-
teering58
  CONCLUSION   
 to build on. I have no doubts, however, that climate 
change profiteering will occur in the eyes of many, regardless of 
whether such conduct is merely socially constructed to be mor-
ally offensive or actually made legally criminal. 
In drawing attention to climate change “winners,” Profes-
sor Ruhl has opened legal, political, and social cans of worms 
that implicate far more than just American climate change pol-
icy. As Americans construct various groups of climate change 
beneficiaries as “winners,” “bad actors,” “natural,” “lucky,” “un-
deserving,” “entrepreneurial,” “visionary,” “heroic,” “exploita-
tive,” “offensive,” “rogue,” “unjust,” “unfair,” or “criminal,” those 
constructions will resonate in social interactions, in cultural 
identity, in community stability, in political debate, and, ulti-
 
 56. See Rymn J. Parsons, Climate Change: The Hottest Issue in Security 
Studies?, 1 RISKS, HAZARDS & CRISIS PUB. POL’Y 87, 101–06 (2010). 
 57. See Renegotiation Act of 1951, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1211–1217 (1970) 
(§§ 1211–1217 omitted from 2006 U.S. Code); United States v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 337 (1942). 
 58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006) (regulating profits from the purchase 
and sale of securities). 
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mately, in law. Perhaps some would prefer not to wrestle with 
these complexities, and there are good, pragmatic reasons that 
Professor Ruhl begins with largely socially acontextual as-
sumptions about how self-defined climate change “winners” will 
behave.  
Again, Professor Ruhl’s recommendations for U.S. climate 
change policies are sound. Nevertheless, it is also important to 
remember that climate change beneficiaries will not, in fact, 
emerge acontextually; rather, their social meaning and political 
and legal significance will be determined to a significant extent 
through social construction, an intensely contextual and hence 
difficult-to-predict process. The point here is not to try to im-
pose precision on that process or to fix the outcomes, but rather 
simply to emphasize two points. First, these social construc-
tions and classifications of climate change beneficiaries are 
likely to generate significant political and legal responses—
more, probably, than Professor Ruhl’s initial exhortation to rec-
ognize that climate change beneficiaries will exist in the first 
place. Second, these social constructions are likely—in at least 
some places and at least some times—to resonate in destabiliz-
ing ways with pre-existing social tensions and cultural fracture 
lines. 
Because climate change “winners” in many circumstances 
may be more visible than the masses who are more invisibly 
“muddling through” whatever climate change adaptation be-
comes necessary, climate change “winners” run the distinct risk 
of becoming cultural lightning rods, for better or for worse. In 
thinking about climate change beneficiaries, therefore, we need 
to consider which kinds of beneficiaries the law should be seek-
ing to constrain—and which kinds the law might need to pro-
tect. 
